At Crypto'99, Dr Coron, Naccache, and Stern presented a signature forgery strategy of the RSA digital signature scheme. The attack is valid on Chaum's blind signature scheme, which has been applied to many practical applications such as electronic cash and voting. In this paper we propose a method to inject a randomizing factor into a message when it is signed by the signer in Chaum's blind signature scheme such that attackers cannot obtain the signer's signatures of the special form for the attack. ᭧
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [18] is one of the widely used techniques in encryption/decryption algorithms or digital signatures. In a secure digital signature scheme, the signature is the proof of the signer, and no one else can deliberately sign the message. This property is usually referred to as the unforgeability property. Based on the RSA cryptosystem, Dr Chaum proposed the first blind signature scheme in 1982 [4] to achieve the unlinkability property. Two parties, a signer and a group of users, participate in a blind signature protocol. The protocol is briefly described below. First, a user blinds a message by performing a blinding process on it. Secondly, the user submits the blinded message to the signer to request the signature on the blinded message. Thirdly, the signer signs the blinded message by using its signing function, and then sends the signing result back to the user. Finally, the user unblinds the signing results by performing an unblinding operation to obtain the signer's signature on his chosen message. The signer's signature on the message can be verified by checking if the corresponding public verification formula with the signature-message pair as parameter is true. In a secure blind signature scheme, it is computationally infeasible for the signer to link a signature shown for verification to the instance of the signing protocol that produced that signature. This property is usually referred to as the unlinkability property [3, 4, 9, 13, 15, 16] . Due to the unlinkability and unforgeability properties, the techniques of blind signatures have been widely used in many advanced electronic communication services where anonymity is indispensable, such as anonymous electronic voting [1, 6, 10, 19] and untraceable electronic cash systems [2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 14] . Dr Coron, Naccache, and Stern proposed a signature forgery of the RSA digital signatures at Crypto'99 [7] . This is a kind of chosen-message attack [11] . The attack described in [7] is a sophisticated variant of DesmedtOdlyzko's method [8] where the attacker obtains the signatures of m 1 , m 2 , …, m t Ϫ1 and forges the signature of an m t that was never submitted to the signer. Let f be a redundancy function and alternatively denote one-way hash function, ISO 9796-2, PKCS #1 v2.0, ANSI X9.31, SSL-3.02 or an ISO 9796-1 variant [7] . Dr Coron, Naccache, and Stern assume that all messages are padded by f before being signed. Before interacting with the signer, the attacker selects t smooth f(m i ) values and expresses f(m t ) as a multiplicative combination of the padded strings f(m 1 ), …, f(m t Ϫ1 ). The signature of m t is then forged by using the homomorphic property of RSA. By obtaining signatures on enough messages of a certain form from a legitimate signer, the attacker can forge signatures on additional messages without the help of the signer. Since these messages have to be of a special form, the signer can detect them before signing and then refuse to sign them. Thus the attack does not really affect the security of the RSA digital signatures. However, in Chaum's blind signature scheme, which is based on the typical RSA digital signatures, since the plain text messages are blinded by users in advance, the signer cannot know the format or the content of the plain text messages when signing them. If the users do not follow some encoding rule specified by the signer to prepare their plain text messages, the signer cannot detect them out when signing. Hence, the attackers can obtain the signer's signatures of the messages that are of the special form of the attack [7] or depend on previously obtained signatures for other chosen-message attacks [11] . It turns out that the chosen-message attacks [7, 11] are valid on Chaum's blind signature scheme.
RSA encryption/decryption and digital signature schemes have been widely used in many computer and information systems. Furthermore, many practical cryptographic techniques based on RSA cryptosystems have been proposed in the literature. Chaum's blind signature is one of the popular techniques based on RSA scheme since it can be applied to payment protocols in electronic commerce and anonymous electronic voting systems; it is urgent to enhance the security of Chaum's scheme for the quality of these advanced communication services. In this paper we propose a method to enhance the randomization of Chaum's blind signature scheme such that attackers cannot predict what the signer exactly signs to avoid threats from chosen-message attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Chaum's blind signature scheme. A randomization enhanced version of Chaum's scheme is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the security of the proposed scheme. Finally, we make a conclusion of this paper in Section 5.
Chaum's blind signature scheme
In Chaum's blind signature scheme, there are two kinds of participants, a signer and a group of users. Users request signatures from the signer and the signer computes and issues blind signatures to the users. The blind signature scheme is described as follows.
1.
Initializing. Initially, the singer randomly selects two distinct large primes p and q, and then computes n pq and fn p Ϫ 1q Ϫ 1: The signer chooses two large integers e and d at random such that ed ϵ 1 mod fn: Then, it publishes (e, n) and a one-way hash function H such as SHA-1 [12] . 2. Blinding. A user chooses a message m and randomly selects an integer t in Z ‫ء‬ n ; which is the set of all positive integers less than and relatively prime to n. The user computes and submits the integer a r e Hm mod n to the signer. 3. Signing. After receiving a , the signer computes and sends the integer t a d mod n to the user. 4. Unblinding. After receiving t, the user performs the unblinding process to obtain s r Ϫ1 t mod n: The integer s is the signer's signature on m.
5.
Verifying. The signature-message pair (s, m) can be verified by checking if s e ϵ Hm (mod n).
Randomization enhanced Chaum's scheme
In this section we present a method to inject a randomizing factor into every message when it is signed by the signer in Chaum's blind signature scheme, and users cannot eliminate these randomizing factors embedded in the signatures obtained from the signer. The details of the proposed scheme are described as follows.
Initializing. According to the key generation protocol of
Chaum's blind signature scheme shown in Section 2, the public and private keys of the signer are (e, n) and (p, q, d), respectively. H is a public one-way hash function such as SHA-1. 2. Blinding. To request a signature of a message m, a user randomly chooses an integer r in Z ‫ء‬ n and a positive integer u less than n, and then computes and submits the integer a r e Hmu 2 ϩ 1 mod n to the signer. After receiving a , the signer randomly selects a positive integer x less than n and sends it to the user. After receiving x, the user randomly chooses an integer b in Z ‫ء‬ n ; and then computes b b e u Ϫ x mod n: Finally, the user submits the integer b to the signer. 3. Signing. After receiving b , the signer computes t ax 2 ϩ 1b Ϫ2 d mod n: Then the signer sends t to the user. The integer x is said to be the randomizing factor. 4. Unblinding. After receiving t, the user computes c ux ϩ 1u Ϫ x Ϫ1 mod n and 
Discussions
In this section we examine the correctness and security of the proposed scheme presented in Section 3. First, from the protocol of Section 3, we have the following theorem to ensure the correctness of the protocol. 
Randomization
In the proposed scheme, the attackers can choose m but they cannot choose (c, m) on which a signature will be calculated due to the randomizing factor x. Theorem 2 shows that the randomizing factor x cannot be removed from the signature by the user. 
Unlinkability
For every instance, numbered i, of the protocol in Section 3, the signer can record the transmitted messages (a i , b i , x i ) between the user and the signer during the instance i of the protocol. The triple (a i , b i , x i ) is usually referred to as the view of the signer to the instance i of the protocol. Thus, we have the following theorem.
